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View Full Version : Chechnya: 1994-96


KG_Jag
12-14-2007, 01:59 AM
From this month's Shrapnel Games newsletter:

"On December 11th, 1994, Russian military forces began an assault on the problem territory of Chechnya. Operational plans were broken down into four phases: (1) Surround Chechyna, encircle the capital of Grozny, and let the air force control the sky (2) Secure Grozny (3) Clear the lowlands and put a pro-Russian government into place (4) Eliminate remaining resistance.

The first three phases were to take around two weeks to complete. Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev even bragged that the operation to take Grozny could be accomplished in two hours with a single airborne regiment.

What really happened was the taking of Grozny took nearly two months, not two hours, and the entire conflict dragged on for nearly two years with the adventure ending in a failure for the Russians. Today we look at the battle for Grozny.

Throughout the Second World War the Soviets had vast experience with military operations in urban terrain, but apparently all that experience had been forgotten by the Russians in the Grozny campaign. The order to begin the Chechnya campaign only allowed the military two weeks worth of planning and positioning. This was mid-December '94, and by New Year's Eve of that year the first Russian troops moved into the vast city covering nearly 100 square miles.

The spearhead was the 131st Independent Motorized Infantry Brigade consisting of 1000 troops, 26 tanks, and 120 armored vehicles. Within seventy-two hours of entering the city the brigade had lost 800 soldiers, 20 tanks, and 102 armored vehicles. 74 members of the brigade were also taken prisoner, along with two Spetsnaz groups that had been fighting on the southern outskirts of the city but had run out of supplies.
With such an utter disaster Russian morale was almost already at a breaking point, made worse by the fact that the troops were completely unprepared for city fighting (or fighting in general). Many troops had never fired live shells, and typical rear area troops such as cooks were being thrust into the action as heavy weapon operators. Friendly fire, poor communication, and no knowledge of the area (maps issued were often at a high scale which did not convey the important street level detail needed in MOUT operations) also contributed to the fiasco.

Reinforcements began to flow into the area, including more elite troops such as marine units from the Pacific, Northern, and Baltic fleets along with more Spetsnaz units. The Russians then began a heavy bombardment campaign, with sometimes as many as 4,000 artillery shells raining down a hour--just like the good ol' days of the Great Patriotic War. With that came the systematic, house by house, block by block, sweep that lasted until the fall of the city on January 20th, 1995.

During the period between the slaughter of the 131st brigade and the final capture the Russians had a Hell of a time. The architect of the defense of Grozny was Chechen Chief of Staff Aslan Maskhadov, who organized the defense by city districts. Each district then had a number of fighting groups (squad level, 8-10 men armed with assault rifles, a couple anti-tank weapons, a light machine gun, and perhaps a sniper rifle) which would then fight the Russians in a series of mobile battles.

While the defenders did create some strong points, for the most part they simply used hit and run tactics.

In the city the Russians were very ill-prepared for the Chechen defense.
Armored vehicles could not depress their weapons far enough when attacked from basements, and could not elevate them high enough when attacked from upper stories. It was not until the Russians started to bring in anti-aircraft platforms (e.g. ZSU-23-4) that they were able to effectively fight the Chechens with vehicles. The Russians were under constant harassment from snipers, and the RPG was a particularly feared weapon thanks to its multiuse capabilities from attacking vehicles, troops, and even being used as an indirect fire weapon.

The Chechens were also able to use cell phones and walkie-talkies to their advantage, even to the point of tricking Russian units with transmitting false information. The Chechens also had a habit of picking off Russian radio operators, further creating a communication havoc with Russian forces.

Eventually the Russians were able to take the city, although the Chechen leadership had already fled the city shortly after the presidential palace, located in the center of Grozny and one objective of the assault, was hit by precision guided munitions. While the city was nominally considered contained by January 20th, 1995, it was not until March 7th that the Russians were able to truly call it contained.

The city was retaken by the Chechens the following year."