In preparation for a potential KG trip next year here is the 1st of (possibly)
many articles on the battle of Antietam.(sight of possible trip)
Due to the length of this article I will post it over 4 or so days.
This is perhaps the Bloodiest ground on the Bloodiest day of the
American Civil War
Battle of Antietam: Carnage in a Cornfield
Mr. Miller's humble cornfield near Antietam Creek became the unlikely setting for perhaps the worst fighting of the entire Civil War.
By Robert C. Cheeks
On Sunday night, September 14, 1862, Confederate General Robert E. Lee issued orders for his much scattered commands to rally at Sharpsburg, Maryland. His ambitious plans to cut the railroad bridge near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, had been thwarted by Major General George McClellan's unusually quick response to his raid into Maryland. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, thinly spread across south-central Maryland and northeastern Virginia, faced the very real threat of being beaten in detail.
All spring and summer the Confederate Army had stymied its blue-frocked adversaries, first in the Peninsula Campaign, where McClellan's Army of the Potomac was repulsed before Richmond, and then during the summer at Cedar Mountain and Second Manassas, where Maj. Gen. John Pope's ill-starred Army of Virginia was routed by the swift-marching Rebels.
Now it was Lee who was caught short. Major Generals James Longstreet and D.H. Hill had barely held the passes on South Mountain two days earlier; the heroism of their worn and hungry troops had given Lee time to reunite his army. It was an urgent matter that required Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson to march his command all night from Harpers Ferry. It was a hard march that left stragglers all the way from Harpers Ferry to Sharpsburg--even Stonewall referred to it as "severe."
The divisions of Longstreet and Hill had arrived first and established their lines on what would be the Confederate right, due west of Antietam Creek and east of Sharpsburg. Major General Lafayette McLaw's division from Longstreet's command, assigned to Jackson for the Harpers Ferry siege, had been forced to turn and fight Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin's VI Corps at Crampton's Gap; as a result his division would be late in arriving. Major General A.P. Hill's famed "Light Division" had been assigned the responsibility of paroling Federal prisoners taken at Harpers Ferry and shipping captured war materiel south. It seemed doubtful the division would be able to make it up the following day.
On the morning of Tuesday, September 16, McClellan had nearly 60,000 soldiers facing Lee's 15,000. His heavy 20-pound Parrott rifles were sending case shot across the creek, feeling out the enemy. As Longstreet ordered a vigorous response-- more for bluff than effect--Lee realized his one chance for salvation lay with McClellan's reverting to his old, timid behavior. McClellan did not disappoint him. Across the creek, the commander of the Federal Army rode about on his horse, Dan Webster, taking the salutes of his admiring infantry and superbly equipped artillery. His boys would pay dearly for their general's indecisiveness.
By noon, Jackson and Brig. Gen. John Walker began to arrive, taking up the Confederate line on the left along the Hagerstown Pike near Dunker Church, north of town, then sweeping southeasterly to a worn farm lane on the Mumma property a mile away. The rest of the afternoon, well into the evening, Confederate stragglers came in. Neither slackers nor deserters, these were the sick and starving who had been unable to keep up with the swift-marching columns.
Lee's ranks had been thinned by casualties, sickness and large-scale desertions, but he had the advantage of position. He'd selected an excellent defensive field in which to fight. The lay of the land permitted the Rebels the opportunity to transfer troops under cover and allowed them to select the most advantageous artillery positions.
On the left flank, Maj. Gen. J.E.B. ("Jeb") Stuart placed Brig. Gen. Fitz Lee's cavalry brigade with his three batteries of Captain John Pelham's Horse Artillery and three additional batteries on an unpretentious hillock known locally as Nicodemus Hill. East of the Hagerstown Pike, Brig. Gen. Evander M. Law's brigade had taken position in the East Woods. Law sent his videttes well to the north and east, keeping a close eye on the Upper Bridge.
By 10 p.m. the artillery fire had nearly ceased, and only intermittent musketry ravaged the night air. Just after midnight it began to rain, a drizzle at first, then a cloudburst that drenched both armies and made everyone miserable. However, the men of Brig. Gen. John Bell Hood's division were elated; they had been given permission to withdraw to the West Woods and cook rations. It would be the first time in nearly three days that the case-hardened soldiers would have the opportunity to eat a warm meal.
Throughout the night, the sudden flash of musketry or the roar of cannon deprived everyone of a decent night's rest. The opposing soldiers made peace with their God, wrote letters to loved ones, and waited. The battle would be joined in the morning.
Between the two armies lay a cornfield owned by David R. Miller. The cornstalks were turning from green to brown, ready to be harvested, 30 acres of corn fodder for Miller's cattle, perhaps a cash crop that would provide a few of the essentials for his family. Whatever plans Miller had for his corn were destined to go awry; his cornfield would soon be transformed into an altar where men in blue and gray would sacrifice their all for honor, duty, and love of regiment.
Fog shrouded the field the next morning, and artillerists on both sides had to wait until the rising sun had burnt off enough fog to permit sighting. Just after dawn, the Confederate guns at Dunker Church, Nicodemus Hill and the North Woods, and the Federal reserve artillery across Antietam Creek, opened with a cacophonous roar, sounding the knell for America's bloodiest day.
http://www.civil-war.net/pages/maps/antietam.jpg
http://www.nps.gov/anti/map_main.htm#